Undue influence is oftentimes the issue that is raised when a decedent makes a change in their estate planning documents which benefits a person (or persons) who have assumed a position of trust and responsibility in the decedent's life. On March 11th, the Indiana Court of Appeals decided a matter involving a parent-child relationship and whether a presumption of undue influence attached when a child benefited from a testamentary disposition from the parent. You can can read about that case here. On March 13, 2009, the Court addressed the same issue in the context of caregivers. While this is not a published opinion, probate attorneys engaged in probate litigation involving caregivers may wish to review:
Dennis M. Horrall, as Successor Trustee of the Mary Y. Skelton Revocable Living Trust, et al. v. Phyllis J. Motts, et al.
Case No. 71A03-0802-CV-48
In this matter, the decedent executed two amendments to her trust. The first amendment benefited one of the decedent's nieces who, at the time the amendment was made, was providing care to the decedent. The bequest would have given the niece fifty percent of the residuary of the trust after certain specific bequests had been made. Four months later, another niece took over the care of the decedent and shortly thereafter the second niece drove the decedent to an attorney who prepared another amendment. The second amendment increased a specific bequest to the second niece, removed the first niece as a beneficiary and named another person as the beneficary of the first niece's bequest. The decedent died shortly thereafter.
Probate litigation ensued with the parties each challenging the validity of the amendment which did not benefit them. After a bench trial, the trial court invalidated both amendments and both parties appealed.
Of particular interest in this case was the claim that there was no showing that the primary benefactor of the second amendment was a person of “trust and confidence” to the settlor sufficient to create a presumption of undue influence. It was also argued there was a lack of evidence that this person dealt unequally with the settlor, had superior knowledge of the matter, or exercised overpowering influence over Yvonne. The Court of Appeals circumvented this argument:
"Having concluded that the court properly invalidated the [second] Amendment due to the unrebutted presumption of undue influence of [the second neice], we need not dissect [the primary beneficary of the second amendment]'s relationship to, or influence on, [the settlor]. Regardless of [this peron's] relationship or influence, the invalidation of the [second] Amendment affects her as well. The unrebutted presumption of undue influence by [the second neice] muddies any attempt to discern [the settlor]'s “clear intent.”
Probate attorneys may also find interesting the Court of Appeal's dissection of an argument that judicial estoppel prevented parties from using the same legal theory, presumption of undue influece, inconsistently. Also of interest, for probate litigation, was the argument that the first amendment was improperly invalidated by the trial court because undue influence, or the presumption of undue influence, was not pled by the parties making that challenge. In this regard, the Court of Appeals noted that "Although the case deviated a bit from its original course, the [Appellants] did not complain while en route and cannot now complain on appeal."
Again, this decision is unpublished and should not be regarded as precedent. But the case does provide useful insight into probate litigation matters.
Dennis M. Horrall, as Successor Trustee of the Mary Y. Skelton Revocable Living Trust, et al. v. Phyllis J. Motts, et al.
Case No. 71A03-0802-CV-48
In this matter, the decedent executed two amendments to her trust. The first amendment benefited one of the decedent's nieces who, at the time the amendment was made, was providing care to the decedent. The bequest would have given the niece fifty percent of the residuary of the trust after certain specific bequests had been made. Four months later, another niece took over the care of the decedent and shortly thereafter the second niece drove the decedent to an attorney who prepared another amendment. The second amendment increased a specific bequest to the second niece, removed the first niece as a beneficiary and named another person as the beneficary of the first niece's bequest. The decedent died shortly thereafter.Probate litigation ensued with the parties each challenging the validity of the amendment which did not benefit them. After a bench trial, the trial court invalidated both amendments and both parties appealed.
Of particular interest in this case was the claim that there was no showing that the primary benefactor of the second amendment was a person of “trust and confidence” to the settlor sufficient to create a presumption of undue influence. It was also argued there was a lack of evidence that this person dealt unequally with the settlor, had superior knowledge of the matter, or exercised overpowering influence over Yvonne. The Court of Appeals circumvented this argument:
"Having concluded that the court properly invalidated the [second] Amendment due to the unrebutted presumption of undue influence of [the second neice], we need not dissect [the primary beneficary of the second amendment]'s relationship to, or influence on, [the settlor]. Regardless of [this peron's] relationship or influence, the invalidation of the [second] Amendment affects her as well. The unrebutted presumption of undue influence by [the second neice] muddies any attempt to discern [the settlor]'s “clear intent.”
Probate attorneys may also find interesting the Court of Appeal's dissection of an argument that judicial estoppel prevented parties from using the same legal theory, presumption of undue influece, inconsistently. Also of interest, for probate litigation, was the argument that the first amendment was improperly invalidated by the trial court because undue influence, or the presumption of undue influence, was not pled by the parties making that challenge. In this regard, the Court of Appeals noted that "Although the case deviated a bit from its original course, the [Appellants] did not complain while en route and cannot now complain on appeal."
Again, this decision is unpublished and should not be regarded as precedent. But the case does provide useful insight into probate litigation matters.
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